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1959] EDSON READ SUNDERLAND 
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND'S ROLE IN 
MICHIGAN PROCEDURE 
Jason L. H onigman * 
13 
MORE than any other individual, Professor Edson R. Sunder-land has had a tremendous impact upon the Michigan law 
of procedure. The procedural reforms which he urged and 
molded into the Michigan law of procedure have been in use for 
nearly half a century, and to this day are the framework for our 
procedural laws. 
The -writer's awareness of Professor Sunderland's influence on 
Michigan procedural laws has been intensified through years of 
labor and study in that same field. Professor Sunderland's impact 
on the -writer began at the inception of our professional training. 
In our first semester at the University of Michigan Law School we 
were imbued with the form and structure of common law pleading 
under the tutelage of Professor Sunderland. The archaic forms 
of the law which constituted the subject matter of common law 
pleadings were made to come to life with a direct, simple and 
graphic approach in a course of study that could easily have been 
dry and difficult. 
The fledgling student was taught to understand the common 
law forms as the historic vehicles for the processing of litigation as 
well as the aims and purposes which they served and their relation 
to modern-day needs and requirements. What the novice did not 
and could not understand was, however, that his teacher was mold-
ing these views not merely in the minds of his students, but as a 
part of the framework of the procedural rules for the entire Bar 
and Bench of the state. Those of us who have succeeded him in 
carrying on this work have for the most part followed the basic 
patterns and signposts which he created. 
In no field of law is a change more embracing than in the field 
of procedure. A revision in any one field of law generally has 
little effect on other fields. A change in procedure, however, must 
in a sense affect all fields of the law. All laws are dependent upon 
the courts for their effectuation. To secure court adjudication in 
any area of the law requires compliance with the rules of proce-
dure. Hence, the impact of procedural changes cuts across all 
other fields of the law and in that sense it has a dominant influence 
in the administration and effectuation of justice. Professor Sun-
• J.D. 1926, University of Michigan; member, Michigan Bar.-Ed. 
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derland's major role in procedural improvement stamps his 
achievements with outstanding significance in the entire field of 
law improvement within this state. 
Of all the areas of the law which need constant changing, the 
procedural field is perhaps foremost. Substantive rules of law 
need comparatively little change when they are basically consonant 
with fundamental rules of justice. Procedural rules on the other 
hand are not an end in themselves. They are only the means to an 
end. They are the means for arriving at the goal of justice. What-
ever means are best suited for that purpose should be employed. 
Modern methods and conditions are ever changing and with those 
changes, the suitability of particular procedures may diminish: To 
adjust to those changes requires continuing changes in the laws of 
procedure. . 
Professor Sunderland recognized early in his career the funda-
mental defect that procedural reform was being unnecessarily 
hampered by the profession's basic adherence to the principle of 
stare decisis. Many years ago he wrote: 
"The common law judges did not, however, distinguish be-
tween rules of law and rules of procedure. Convinced of the 
necessity of following precedent in one field they pursued the 
same course in the other, and the result was the utter stagna-
tion of procedure. Rules became perpetually binding merely 
because they were once announced, and the elasticity vanished 
from common law practice."1 
Professor Sunderland recognized more clearly than anyone else 
that in the field of procedure "novelty, inventiveness and boldness 
are so much needed."2 He urged the concept that in the field of 
procedure simplicity and directness were needed to assure the at-
tainment of justice in litigation. He preached the formulation of 
new rules of procedure to meet the needs of modern methods and 
modern courts. He sought to cut through the barriers of precedent 
and hypertechnicalities that stood in the way of the swift and effi-
cient administration of justice. Almost a half century ago he said: 
"If the old actions are to go why not provide an entirely 
modern substitute? Why stop short in the process of simplifi-
cation? ... Logically the whole question is one of convenience 
1 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 296 
(1924). 
2Id. at 295. 
1959] EDSON READ SUNDERLAND 
in judicial administration. If many forms of action are better 
adapted for general use they should be employed; but if fewer 
forms result in a simpler and more effective procedure, then 
fewer should be used .... 
"The purpose of pleading has ceased to be the exemplifica-
tion of the subtilties of pleader's logic and has become the 
intelligible disclosure of the real nature of the respective 
claims of the parties. If this sensible and reasonable test is to 
be substituted for the old test of the common law, the old 
forms of declaration ought to give place to the others more in 
harmony with the new standard of sufficiency. The cumber-
some, discursive, redundant and involved precedents which 
our local practice books have scrupulously preserved for pro-
fessional use, and which conservative lawyers could hardly 
refuse to follow, ought to be supplanted by other more mod-
ern, direct and business-like forms which disclose on their face 
a greater regard for efficiency than for conventionality.''3 
15 
Recognizing as he did, the dire need for procedural improve-
ment, he undertook the labors to bring them about. At one point 
he informs us: "Reforms are not brought about spontaneously. 
Some agency must propose, formulate and validate them.''4 For 
the State of Michigan, in large measure, he was the "agency.'' 
While the enactment of rules of procedure are the primary prov-
ince of the state supreme court, it takes considerable time and 
study to propose specific improvements in the procedural laws. 
On this point Professor Sunderland points out: 
"While the members of a state supreme court are ordinarily 
too busy to devote much time to the study of procedural prob-
lems and the drafting of new rules, the same is equally true of 
those members of the bar who, by reason of their broad ex-
perience, are best qualified to see defects in the current 
practice and to pass upon proposals for improvement. The 
appointment of a commission of lawyers does not alone solve 
the problem. Someone must be able, for considerable periods, 
to devote his time continuously to the work.''5 
3 Sunderland, "The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915," 14 MICH. L. REv. 273 at 385-
386, 553 (1915). 
4 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 294 
(1924). 
5 Sunderland, "The New Michigan Court Rules," 29 MICH. L. REv. 586 at 588 (1931). 
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That "someone" was Professor Sunderland. His vigorous ef-
forts in the field of proposing and drafting new rules of procedure 
for the State of Michigan are evidenced as early as 1915 when the 
Michigan Judicature Act was enacted by the legislature, and the 
1916 Michigan Court Rules were adopted by the state supreme 
court. He was a member of the Committee of the Michigan State 
Bar which drafted the 1916 rules, which were in substance adopted 
by the Michigan Supreme Court. They were the first general 
revisions since the adoption of the Rules of 1897. 
In 1927, he was appointed by the Governor to a five-man 
statutory commission for extensive revision of the rules of practice 
and procedure.6 As secretary of that commission, he carried the 
major role in draftsmanship and recommendations for rule 
changes. This major revision resulted in the 1931 Michigan 
Court Rules which instituted the most concerted changes in the 
history of Michigan procedure. Despite subsequent revisions, the 
major portion of these changes are still a part of the basic rules of 
Michigan procedure. 
To understand Professor Sunderland's contribution to Michi-
gan rules of procedure, one must be acquainted with the history 
of Michigan's procedural laws. From its inception as a territorial 
government, Michigan adopted the common law forms of plead-
ing. It followed the common law procedures except as changed 
by statutes enacted by the legislature or rules adopted by the state 
supreme court. As early as the Michigan Constitution of 1850, 
provision was made (art. VI, §5) that "the supreme court shall, by 
general rules, establish, modify, and amend the practice in such 
court and in the circuit courts and simplify the same." Despite 
this granting of constitutional power, the Michigan Supreme Court 
had for many years shown reticence in revision of procedural laws 
through exercise of its rule-making powers. In default of vigorous 
action by that court, procedural laws were enacted by the legisla-
ture. Professor Sunderland describes the situation thus: 
"Meanwhile the legislature of Michigan, observing that the 
court rule system was functioning very weakly, took up the_ 
burden of regulating procedure, and in spite of the constitu-
tional delegation of power to the supreme court, the legisla-
tive enactment of rules of practice has proceeded with almost 
as much vigor as though no such provision existed in the con-
6 Mich. Pub. Acts (1927), Act No. 377. 
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stitution, and the supreme court has never officially questioned 
the validity and binding effect of rules of procedure enacted 
by the legislature. "7 
17 
Such changes of procedure as were made by court rules were 
generally adopted at the insistence of committees of the State Bar 
Association. As previously indicated, Professor Sunderland took a 
leading part as a member of those committees in the major revisions 
which took place in 1915 and 1931. One of his important contri-
butions in this field was the urging of vigorous action by the 
Michigan Supreme Court in its constitutionally designated field of 
enactment of procedural laws. 
He devoted a large measure of his time and effort not merely 
in the draftsmanship of the rules, but in researching material to 
support the need for the changes proposed and the means best 
suited for arriving at them. The 1916 Court· Rules were largely 
supplemental to the Judicature Act which was passed by the 
legislature at about the same time. By the new legislative enact-
ments and the new rules most of the common law pleading forms 
were eliminated in the interests of simplifications of procedure. 
At the same time separate rules for law and chancery suits were 
eliminated and substituted with a single set of circuit court rules 
which governed both law and chancery cases. 
In promulgating the 1931 Rules, the changes proposed for 
procedural improvement were the most sweeping in the history 
of the state. Professor Sunderland not only labored in the framing 
of these rules and the preparation of the necessary data in justifica-
tion thereof, but actively took part in urging support for these 
changes at many meetings of local bar associations and at a special 
meeting of the State Bar Association called for the express purpose 
of considering these rule changes. Professor Sunderland reports 
that some 68 amendments were presented to the supreme court 
after the first published draft of the proposed rules in order to 
meet the criticisms and suggestions which came from members of 
the bar throughout the state.8 
By the 1931 Rules, the basic form of pleading in law actions 
was made to conform with that of chancery actions by providing 
for elimination of common law forms of declaration, pleas of gen-
7 Sunderland, "The Machinery of Procedural Reform," 22 MICH. L. REv. 293 at 302 
(1924). 
s Sunderland, "The New Michigan Court Rules," 29 MICH. L REv. 586 (1931). 
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eral issue and general denials. Instead there was substituted the 
requirement for pleading specific factual statements and admis-
sions or denials, which are not mere general denials, but explain 
where feasible the basis for such denial. Drastic changes were 
also made in the procedure for summary disposition of litigation 
through summary judgments and by motion to dismiss based on 
various special defenses such as lack of jurisdiction, lack of legal 
capacity to sue, pendency of other action, res adjudicata, statute 
of limitations, release and statute of frauds. At the same time, 
provision was made for additional discovery and admission 
procedures as well as simplification of non-jury trials in law actions. 
The greatest changes under the 1931 Rules were made in the 
field of appellate procedure with provision for simplification by a 
single method of appeal in place of some fourteen different gen-
eral methods and about thirty additional special methods provided 
for by common law and statute. While important amendments in 
appellate and other procedures were made in 1933, 1945, and 1956, 
and lesser changes in other years, the changes imposed by the 1931 
Court Rules form, for the most part, the basic procedural rules at 
the present time. 
There is no doubt that the rules drafted by Professor Sunder-
land will for many years to come remain a part of the basic frame-
work of the procedural laws of this state. In time, it is true, that 
his draftsmanship will be replaced by other rules made to fit the 
ever-changing needs of the times. Yet, long after the rules which 
he drafted will have ceased to serve their purpose, the principles 
which he molded into the Michigan law of procedure will remain 
alive and buoyapt. Our supreme court today, more than ever, 
shows readiness to meet its constitutional responsibilities in the 
field of procedural revision. Through his influence, the principles 
of wholesome acceptance of the need for continuing revision of 
procedural laws and abandonment of the limitations of stare decisis 
will remain a heritage of those who labor in the field of judicial 
administration. So, too, will the acceptance of the need for simplifi-
cation and modernization to arrive at a speedy and efficient ad-
ministration of justice. While those principles remain imbedded 
in Michigan's procedural laws, the impact of Professor Sunder-
land's contribution will still be felt. In view of the eternal verities 
of those principles, it is hardly likely that his impact will ever be 
lost. 
